The paper deals with division situations where individual claims can vary within closed intervals. Uncertainty of claims is removed * This paper was written while the authors were research fellows at the ZiF (Bielefeld) for the project "Procedural Approaches to Conflict Resolution", 2002. We thank our hosts for their hospitality. 
Introduction
Division problems where claimants are facing uncertainty regarding their claims arise from many economic situations. We concentrate here on situations where a certain amount of money has to be divided among claimants who can merely indicate the range of their claims in the form of a closed interval, and the available amount is smaller than the aggregated lower claim.
Funds's allocation of a firm among its divisions (cf. Pulido et al. (2002a, b) ), taxation problems (cf. Young (1988) ), priority problems (cf. Moulin (2000) ), distribution of delay costs of a joint project among the agents involved (cf. ), various disputes including those generated by inheritance (cf. O'Neill (1982)) or by cooperation in joint projects based on restricted willingness to pay of agents (cf. ) fit into this framework.
We conquer interval uncertainty of claims by compromising, in a consistent way, the upper and lower bounds of the claim intervals, and by tackling deterministic division problems based on compromise claims. Several procedures which yield families of efficient and reasonable rules are described.
Building blocks for the introduced families of parametric solutions are onepoint solutions generated by rules for classical division problems.
Three of the most well known rules, namely the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule, and the constrained equal losses rule, are used in our examples in the next sections. The reader is referred to Herrero and Villar (2001) for understanding their characterizing properties and getting insight into types of situations in which one of these rules is more suitable than others.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we formally introduce the family of division problems under interval uncertainty of claims, and define compromise claims. The model of a bankruptcy problem and the three appealing well known division rules are briefly presented. Then it is indicated how compromise claims can be used to generate uncertainty-free division problems related to a division problem under interval uncertainty of claims and how rules for deterministic division problems yield efficient and reasonable rules for the division problem affected by uncertainty. Section 3 introduces and studies two families of rules. Rules in one family are based on averaging solutions generated by compromise claims, while rules in the other family are based on spreading the available amount over compromise claims. For each family it is shown that the rules are efficient and reasonable.
A transparent rule which is a particular case of averaging is motivated by the wishes of the claimants. Section 4 deals with multi-stage rules obtained by aggregating shares allocated to claimants in successive stages. The case of a two-stage rule is exemplified. We conclude in Section 5 with remarks on axiomatic characterization and existing literature on division rules under interval uncertainty. uncertainty is defined as a pair (E, I), where 0 < E ≤ P i∈N a i . We denote by =D N the set of all division problems of the form (E, I).
Note that if all claim intervals I i , i ∈ N are degenerated intervals, i.e. I i = [a i , a i ], the problem (E, I) coincides with the classical bankruptcy problem (E, a) with a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and 0 < E ≤ P i∈N a i . Moreover, all division problems on N with sharp claims w.r.t. the available amount E, of the form
In the following we use the notation D N to refer to the family of classical division problems related to a division problem under interval uncertainty of claims.
A rule for division problems under interval uncertainty of claims is a
(ii) reasonable if
An efficient rule allocates shares to claimants so that the total available amount E is cleared. A reasonable rule gives each claimant a feasible (nonnegative) amount which is smaller than the upper bound of the corresponding claim interval.
In Sections 3 and 4 we will provide procedures for generating efficient and reasonable solutions based on the selection of a suitable rule f for a classical
For the rest of the paper we will assume that
the claim vector and satisfies the following two properties:
and (ii) reasonability, i.e.
To exemplify our procedures we use the proportional rule (P ROP ), the constrained equal awards rule (CEA), and the constrained equal losses rule (i) The i-th coordinate of P ROP (E, d) is given by
According to this rule, the amount E is divided among the claimants proportionally to their individual claims.
(ii) The i-th coordinate of CEA (E, d) is given by
where α solves P i∈N min {d i , α} = E. The idea here is that every claimant receives the same amount as long as this does not exceed his claim.
(iii) The i-th coordinate of CEL (E, d) is given by
where β solves
Here the difference between the aggregate claim and the estate is distributed equally. Since for some claimants the corresponding amount might be negative, the rule respects the fact that no claimant ends up with a negative payoff. 
Given the amount E, for each t-compromise claim c t , we can consider the deterministic division problem (E, c t ) ∈ D N , which we call the t-compromise problem. Applying a rule f to (E, c t ) yields a solution for the problem (E, I) ∈ =D N . We define the t-compromise solution of (E, I) based on
Remark 1 Note that the vector I = (I 1 , . . . , I n ) of claim intervals generates a hypercube Q i∈N I i in < N + . Of course, each point z in it can be considered as a compromise claim. However, we will concentrate mainly on the t-compromise claims defined by (1), which lie on the diagonal through the lower claim point a and the upper claim point b of this hypercube.
One-stage solutions based on compromise claims
In this section two families of solutions based on compromise claims are introduced. One is based on averaging t-compromise solutions, and the other one is based on spreading the available amount over t-compromise claims. 
Averaging t-compromise solutions
for each (E, I) ∈ =D N and each i ∈ N.
Proposition 2 Let f and µ be as above. Then the rule ϕ f,µ is efficient and reasonable.
Proof. To prove that ϕ f,µ is efficient take (E, I) ∈ =D N . Then we have
The reasonability of ϕ f,µ follows from
by integrating over [0, 1] and using the monotonicity property of integrals. 
Example 4 Let µ be the Lebesgue measure λ, f = CEA, E = 8, I 1 = [3, 10],
A transparent procedure leading to solutions taking explicitly into account the wishes of the claimants is presented in the following. 
If the claimants express their joint wishes by delivering the same value e t ∈ [0, 1] then only one deterministic problem, namely ³ E, c e t´, has to be solved and this corresponds to the rule ϕ f,µ with µ = δ e t .
Remark 5 In the procedure above the claimants deliver values t 1 , . . . , t n to generate compromise claims. We can also design a procedure where the claimants deliver directly compromise claims z 1 , . . . , z n from the hypercube introduced in Remark 1 and then divide E w.r.t. a rule f applied to the
Spreading E over compromise claims
Let µ be a probability measure on h[0, 1] , Bi where B is the σ-algebra of Borel subsets of [0, 1]. Let f be a rule for classical division problems.
Then, we can define a rule ϕ f,µ,σ : =D N (σ) → < N based on f as follows:
for each (E, I) ∈ =D N (σ) and each i ∈ N.
Note that by taking µ = δ s and
Proposition 6 Let f, µ, σ be as above. Then ϕ f,µ,σ : =D N (σ) → < N is efficient and reasonable.
Proof. Take (E, I) ∈ =D N (σ). Then the efficiency of ϕ f,µ,σ follows from
For the reasonability of ϕ f,µ,σ note that from
Example 7 for t ∈ (0, 1]. Then R 1 0 σ (t) Edµ (t) = E and c t = (6 + 4t, 12 + 8t) for Let k be a positive integer and E be the available amount in the division problem (E, I) ∈ =D N . We can see the amount E as a budget of a firm that has to be allocated to its divisions during a fixed number of periods.
Based on this interpretation, our idea is to take a sequence hE 1 , . . . , E k i with P k r=1 E r = E and a sequence ht 1 , . . . , t k i of numbers in [0, 1], and to divide at each step r ∈ {1, . . . , k} the amount E r , according to the compromise claim vector c tr = t r b r + (1 − t r ) a r , where a 1 = a, b 1 = b, and a r and b r for r = 2, . . . , k are defined as follows:
Then as a result we obtain the aggregate payoff vector
which can be denoted by ϕ f,h(t 1 ,E 1 ),... ,(t k ,E k )i (E, I). 
Final remarks
In this paper we focus on division problems where individual claims can vary within closed intervals, and conquer interval uncertainty by consider- and the problem is to assign to each i ∈ N a certain weight w i ∈ [a i , b i ] where P i∈N w i = 1 and P i∈N a i ≤ 1 ≤ P i∈N b i . By using axioms of anonymity, merge and continuity they find a unique solution; then the available amount
